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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-JumcIAL PoWERs-STATE TAXPAYER DENIED STANDPARTY IN INTEREST IN BmLB READING CASE-Plaintiffs sought a judgment
to declare unconstitutional a New Jersey statute which required the reading
of five verses of the Old Testament at the opening of each day in the public
schools. 1 Plaintiffs contended that the practice under the statute was an "establishment of religion" prohibited by the First Amendment2 and applicable to the
several states through the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Both plaintiffs were taxpayers of New Jersey, and one was also the parent of a
child who had attended a public school, but had left school before the appeal
was taken. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the law was constituttional.8 On appeal, held, dismissed, three justices dissenting. The dispute is not
a "case or controversy" within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394
(1952).
Article III of the United States Constitution restricts the jurisdiction of federal courts to questions which are presented in the form of a "case or controversy."4 Thus, the Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation
unless adverse parties have a substantial interest in an actual controversy.5 These
concepts which have been developed to apply the "case or controversy" limitation have a flexibility which permits the Court to refuse jurisdiction in some instances when it feels that the particular facts do not present a fair test of the
constitutional question in issue. 6 Such use of this procedural device as a reflection of judicial attitude toward the manner of deciding substantive legal questions is illustrated by the principal case. Both of the plaintiffs are denied standing as taxpayers because they can show no "measurable appropriation or disbursement of school-district funds" resulting from the practice of Bible reading. 7 One
plaintiff is denied standing as the parent of a school child because the child was
graduated from school when the appeal was taken; the question is moot, thereING AS

lN.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §18:14-77.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof..••" U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. I.
8 Doremus v. Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 75 A. (2d) 880 (1950). Bible reading
in public schools has been widely litigated in state courts under vacying state constitutional
provisions. Cases collected, 141 A.L.R. 1145 (1942); see 2 SToKEs, CmrncH AND STATE
IN THB UNITED STATES 549 (1950); TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
IN fu.mruCA 244 (1948).
4 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250 (1911).
5 Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 at 241, 57 S.Ct. 461 (1937).
6 HARrus, THE JUDICIAL PoWER OF THB UNITED STATES 35 (1940).
7 Principal case at 397.
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fore, so far as any injury to the parent or child, because of the allegedly unconstitutional practice, is concemed.8 The dissent in the principal case would give
the plaintiffs standing as taxpayers, contending that if the Bible reading is an
"establishment of religion" then there is a mismanagement of the tax supported
schools.9 The division of the Court is upon the propriety of a state taxpayers'
suit in this particular context. It is clear that a federal taxpayer would not
have sufficient interest in the expenditure of federal treasury funds to challenge
a comparable federal law unless he could show some injury not suffered in common with other taxpayers.10 State taxpayers' suits, however, usually present a
"case or controversy" when state expenditures are in issue in a federal court.11
Because precedent would seem to justify jurisdiction in the principal case, it is
believed that the denial of jurisdiction is significant as an avoidance of the
substantive constitutional question of whether Bible reading under state law
is an "establishment of religion.'' In the Everson12 and McCollum18 cases, the
Court stated the constitutional prohibition against an "establishment of religion"
in language so broad14 that virtually any state law which related religion and
public education could be invalid under it. 15 In each of these cases there was
a substantial interest urging unconstitutionality of the alleged "establishment
of religion.'' In the Everson case, the complaining taxpayers' money was being
taken from the school district fund to provide transportation for children attend8 Principal case at 396, citing United States v. Alaska Steamship Co., 253 U.S. 113,
40 S.Ct. 448 (1920).
9 Principal case at 398.
.
1 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597 (1923). As to when a federal
taxpayer will have sufficient interest see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 312
(1936).
11 Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1879); Cf. Frothingham v. Mellon, supra
note IO at 487; standing to a state taxpayer was denied in Williams v. Riley, 280 U.S. 78,
50 S.Ct. 63 (1929). The majority of state courts allow a taxpayer to question the constitutionality of state practices. Page v. King, 285 Pa. 153, 131 A. 707 (1926); cases collected 174 A.L.R. 549 (1948). Contra, denying a taxpayer standing to question the constitutionality of an appropriation to a denominational college, Bull v. Stichman, 273 App.
Div. 311, 78 N.Y.S. (2d) 279 (1948), affd. 298 N.Y. 516, 80 N.E. (2d) 661 (1948),
noted 17 FORDHAM L. RBv. 107 (1948).
12 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947).
13 McCollom v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948).
14 "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups••••" Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 at 15, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947).
15 Dissenting opinion of Reed, J., McCollom v. Board of Education, supra note 13 at
240; opinion of Desmond, J., Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. (2d) 463 (1951).
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ing parochial schools. 16 In the McCollum case, the complainant objecting to the
religious education program conducted in a public school was the parent of a
child attending the school.17 Had jurisdiction been accepted in the principal
case, however, the New Jersey statute, representing the interest of the state in
educating its citizens, would have been balanced against only the abstract constitutional prohibition against an '<::stablishment of religion," and not against
any actual injury suffered because of the Bible reading. The result of the
principal case, therefore, seems to be that the interest of the state will be
weighed upon the constitutional scales only if there is a real injury alleged as
limiting such interest. Although this decision fails to answer a s~rious constitutional question,18 it is a welcome indication that the Supreme Court _recognizes the responsibility of the great power it assumed as a "National School
Board.''19

Frank M. Bowen, Jr., S. Ed.

16 Supra note 12.
17 Supra note 13.
18 In effect, if not

in theory, a substantive constitutional question may be decided by
denying standing to sue. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 58 S.Ct. 300 (1938),
noted 51 HAnv. L. RBv. 897 (1938). If some injury can be shown, a parent would probably have standing to sue under facts comparable to those of the principal case. West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 6~ S.Ct. 1178 (1943). In
the principal case no injury was even alleged, principal case at 396.
19 The Court's assumption of power is criticized by Corwin, "The Supreme Court as
a National School Board," 14 LAw AND CoNTEM, Pnon. l (1949); in support of such
assumption see Pfeffer, "Church and State: Something Less than Separation," 19 Umv.
Cm. L. RBv. 1 (1951).

